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McCormick: Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma: Ninth Circ

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION v. CITY
OF PETALUMA: NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS "YES" TO
PETALUMA'S CONTROLLED
GROWTH PLAN
In a decision with potentially far-reaching implications for future
land use planning and zoning law developments, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Construction Industry
Association v. City of Petaluma,1 held that a city has the right to limit

and control the numerical extent, aesthetic quality, and geographical
direction of its own growth.

Reversing the much commented upon 2

holding3

district court
denying the application of such expansive zoning
powers, the Ninth Circuit concluded the "Petaluma Plan ' 4 of controlled
growth, which limited new housing units to a number designed to effect
an eventual optimum population level, fell within the broad parameters
of legitimate governmental interests, permitting exercise of the city's

public welfare zoning powers. This note will examine the bases for
the appellate court decision and offer an analysis of the potential impact
and significance of its holding. To facilitate these goals, it is necessary
to review the origins of the Petalumacontroversy.
1. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
2. A number of articles have dealt with the district court decision and the right
to travel issue. See generally Note, Municipal Self-Determination: Must Local Control
of Growth Yield to Travel Rights?, 17 ARz. L. REv. 145 (1975); Note, ZoningPopulation Control in Metropolitan Areas-Municipal Ordinances Limiting the Number
of Building Permits for the Purpose of Restricting Population Growth Held Unconstitutional Infringement on the Right to Travel, Where There isNo Shortage of Municipal
Facilities to Serve the New Residents, 3 FoRDHAM Un. LJ. 137 (1974); 23 KAN. L.
Rnv. 324 (1975); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The Right to Travel as a Limitation Upon
the Exercise of the Zoning Power, 36 Omio ST. LT. 128 (1975); 28 VAiNm. L.Rv. 430
(1975); Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YALE
LU. 1564 (1975).
3. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
4. The controversial Petaluma Plan is actually comprised of a series of resolutions
adopted by Petaluma's City Council in 1972. 522 F.2d at 901. For a reproduction of
the important Residential Development System portion of the Plan, see Landman, No,
Mr. Bosselman, The Town of Ramapo Cannot Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the
Whole World: A Reply (Part1), 10 TuLsA L.J. 169, 193-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Landman]. Although the Plan, on its face, was restricted to a five year period (19721977), id. at 901, the district court concluded that official attempts had been made to
perpetuate the Plan through 1990. 375 F. Supp. at 577.
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BACKGROUND

Petaluma's growth control plan and the subsequent judicial test of
its validity resulted from the city's apprehension over the physical
changes rapidly occurring in the city and its environs, due to the essentially uncontrolled growth which first afflicted the city in the late 1960's
and continued into the 1970's.5 Due to the geographical expansion of
the San Francisco metropolitan area,6 Petaluma was being transformed
from an agricultural community into a Bay Area commuter suburb; the
city feared the total loss of its rural character. 7 It was from such concerns that the comprehensive Petaluma Plan was developed.
The Petaluma Plan had three general purposes: (1) to moderate
the soaring growth rate the city was experiencing; (2) to geographically
balance the growth which would be allowed; and (3) to retain and protect what was left of the small town character of the city.8 The projected effect of the Plan was to reduce the future population level to
a figure substantially below that which would be experienced if the
5. From 1950 to 1970, Petaluma experienced steady growth, with a population
increase from 10,315 to 24,870. Based on unofficial figures, however, Petaluma's population had reached 30,500 by November of 1972, an increase of almost 25% in just
over two years. 522 F.2d at 900. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of growth
patterns in Petaluma, city officials concluded that if the growth trend continued unabated, the city would have a population of 77,000 by 1985. 375 F. Supp. at 574.
6. Petaluma is located in Sonoma County, about 40 miles north of San Francisco.
Due to its proximity to the metropolitan area and the relatively inexpensive housing
available in Petaluma, the city has become increasingly popular with commuters working
in the metropolitan Bay Area. 522 F.2d at 900.
7. While during the early 1960's Petaluma's leaders generally assumed growth was
desirable, the dramatic population increase experienced in the early 1970's resulted in
heightened concern over unrestrained growth. 375 F. Supp. at 575. As a reflection
of its change in perception, the city established a temporary freeze on housing development in early 1971 as an interim control device. 522 F.2d at 900. Responses to questionnaires sent to approximately 10,000 city residents in 1971 indicated an overwhelming
desire to limit growth. The city council's official statement on Petaluma's development
policy further reflected these sentiments: "In order to protect its small town character
and surrounding open spaces, it shall be the policy of the City to control its future
rate and distribution of growth. . . " 375 F. Supp. at 576 (emphasis added).
8. Statements in the Plan itself suggest its general purpose was to ensure that "development in the next five years, will take place in a reasonable, orderly, attractive
manner rather than in a completely haphazard and unattractive manner." 522 F.2d
at 901. The specific purposes of the Plan were: (1) to correct the imbalance in housing which existed between single-family and multi-family dwellings as a result of the
overwhelming emphasis placed on the construction of single-family homes in Petaluma
during the 1960's; (2) to encourage an east-west balance in development to curb the
sprawl of the City to the east; (3) to provide for a variety in densities of housing
units per acre, building types and the ranges of prices and rental costs; (4) to ensure
the planned infilling of close in vacant areas; and, of course, (5) to retard the growth
rate. Id. at 900-02.
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growth level was allowed to continue its rapid rise unabated.9 The
methods by which the city's goals were to be accomplished consisted
primarily of: (1) limiting new housing units to five hundred a year; 10
(2) creating an urban extension line around the city to serve as a
boundary for future expansion; 1 and (3) severely restricting the

extension of city facilities and services beyond the urban extension
line.

12

9. While the city had forecast a potential population of 77,000 by 1985 without
growth controls, city officials concluded that under the Plan the projected maximum
population of Petaluma in 1990 would be 55,000. Id. at 901, n.1. However, subsequent
to the Ninth Circuit decision, Petaluma City Manager Robert Meyer suggested that the
upper growth level might result in an ultimate population of between 70,000 and 90,000,
despite the implementation of the Plan. THE AmE.IcAN Crry & CouNTY, Oct. 1975,
at 40. Meyer did not specify when this figure might be reached and did not indicate
disappointment in the higher figures mentioned. Instead, he voiced satisfaction that
such growth would be planned growth. Id.
10. The Plan limited housing development to 500 dwelling units per year, for a
total of 2,500 units throughout the operative five-year period of the Plan. However,
the units covered by this provision included only those projects involving five units or
more. Single-family homes and four-unit apartment buildings were not included within
the purview of the Plan; rather, it was principally directed at the large number oft tract
homes which had proliferated in Petaluma. 522 F.2d at 901. Prior to the Plan s implementation, the following number of housing units were completed in Petaluma:
.379
1968
270
1964
358
1969
440
1965
591
1970
-321
1966
891
1971234
1967
Id. at 900. The court of appeals noted the trend was toward increased demand for
housing permits and that, without some governmental control on growth, consumer demand would continue to rise. The Plan effectively limited housing starts to approximately 6% of the existing housing stock per year. Id. at 902.
One of the most important and innovative aspects of the 500-unit limitation concerned the Residential Development Control System, which provides a method whereby
building permits are allocated on a point system. Points are awarded to builders whose
projects conform with the City's general plan and environmental and architectural design
plans, and that provide low and moderate income dwelling units and various recreational
facilities. The greater the conformity to these requirements, the more points the builder
is awarded. This provides an obviously strong method of governmental control over
the type of housing constructed in Petaluma. Id. at 901. During the initial period
of the Plan's application, it appears that the city realized a substantial measure of success
in its efforts to exert this control. See THE NEw REPumic, September 21, 1974, at
11.
11. The urban extension line consisted of a 200' wide "greenbelt" around the city
which served as a boundary for future urban expansion. Development was not permitted
within or beyond this line, so that proper infilling would occur within the area inside
of the greenbelt. As a further effort to control the imbalance in growth which plagued
Petaluma, the extension line in certain parts of the city was closer to existing housing
developments than in other areas, thus effectively limiting the geographical space within
which rapidly expanding areas could continue to grow. Additionally, in these same
areas, the boundary to expansion was imposed for ten to fifteen years, whereas in other
sections, where growth was encouraged, the line was to be utilized only for the fiveyear life of the Plan itself. 522 F.2d at 901.
12. Instead of routinely supplying water and sewage facilities as in the past, the
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THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION

Two Petaluma landowners and the Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County brought suit challenging the constitutionality of
the Plan, contending it violated the right to travel of those unnamed
third persons who might desire to live in Petaluma, but who would be
precluded from doing so because of the unavailability of housing resulting from the Plan's implementation.' 8 As to themselves directly, the
plaintiffs alleged the city's action was arbitrary and unreasonable,
violating their due process rights as guaranteed under the fourteenth
amendment. 4 Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed the effect of the
Plan was exclusionary in nature and consequently beyond the scope of
legitimate governmental zoning interests."a
Finally, the plaintiffs
argued that the Plan constituted an unreasonable burden on interstate
16
commerce.
In considering the plaintiffs' allegations, the district court focused
primarily on the right to travel issue and the conflicting interests
presented therein.' 7 In analyzing the potential consequences of the
Plan, the court concluded that due to the imposed housing limitations,
which would restrict development to a level below that of demographic
projections,' 8 some individuals would be prevented from moving to
Petaluma-thereby placing additional pressure on other communities
in the area to supply housing to satisfy this unfulfilled demand. 1 Ultimately, the court theorized, other cities around Petaluma would be
tempted to adopt similar growth policies which could result in a disruptive effect upon the availability of housing in the entire area, further
city decided not to provide such facilities beyond the extension line in an effort to complement the other aspects of the growth plan, thereby retaining further direct control
over development. 375 F. Supp. at 576; Tm NEW REPUBLIC, September 21, 1974, at
10.
13. 522 F.2d at 902. For articles providing a comprehensive treatment of the right
to travel issue, see sources cited at note 2 supra, and the discussion in the district court
decision, 375 F. Supp. at 583-86.
14. 522 F.2d at 905.
15. Id. at 906.
16. Id. at 905.
17. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
18. The district court found that the 2,000 housing units approved by the city in
1970-71 represented the fair measure of the market and demographic demands for housing in Petaluma at the time of the Plan's development. Id. at 575. Since the Plan
limited new housing units to 500 per year, the court concluded this restricted development to a number below the natural housing market requirements, and interfered with
the existing demographic demand. Id. at 575.
19. Id. at 577, 579.
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frustrating the desire and right of individuals to freedom of travel.20
After concluding that freedom of travel was a fundamental right subject
to constitutional protection, 21 the court found the Petaluma Plan
resulted in an unconstitutional violation of this right, unsupported by any
compelling governmental interest which could not be furthered by
alternative measures. 22
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
In rejecting the holding of the district court, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals arrived at conclusions directly at variance with those
of the district court. The major points of dispute between the two
courts focused on the right to travel issue, the alleged arbitrariness of
the Plan, and the asserted burdensome impact of the Plan on interstate

commerce.
The Right to Travel

A principal area of disagreement between the district court and
the Ninth Circuit concerned the threshold issue of the plaintiffs' stand20. In this regard, the court noted:
The San Francisco metropolitan region is generally self-contained and
has a unitary housing market. Persons excluded from one suburb do not
leave the region but seek housing elsewhere in the area. Where suburbs not
practicing exclusionary growth limitation are forced to absorb not only their
own 'share' of the population growth, but also the excluding suburb's as well,
they tend to retaliate by adopting exclusionary measures of their own.
Id. at 578-79. Should this occur, the district court concluded it would result in deterioration of the housing stock in the entire area, and that "serious and damaging dislocation
will occur in the housing market, the commerce it represents, and in the travel and
settlement of people in need and in search of housing." Id. at 579. In support of
this conclusion, the court found that if the Petaluma Plan limitations were to be adopted
throughout the entire San Francisco region, a "shortfall" in needed housing of approximately 105,000 units for the decade 1970-1980 would result. Id. at 580.
21. Id. at 581. In making this finding, the district court relied upon Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(19699; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
22. The city advanced three "compelling interests" to justify the exclusionary measures within the Plan: (1) inadequate sewage facilities to serve an uncontrolled population; (2) inadequacy of the city's water supply; and (3) the city's inherent right, by
virtue of its zoning power, to control its growth. The district court concluded the city
had sufficient sewage capacity and water resources to serve the anticipated natural
growth. In the event the city encountered difficulties in supplying the growing needs
of the community, the court found that alternative means, including simply expanding
the sewage treatment plant and contracting for additional amounts of water, were available which were less restrictive of the right to travel than the Petaluma Plan. Id. at
583.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:129

ing to litigate the constitutional question of the right to travel. Because
standing to litigate the right to travel question was central to the district
court's decision, the appellate court carefully scrutinized this issue.
The district court dealt with the issue of standing in an almost
cursory manner, 23 relying principally upon language in Memorial
Hospitalv. MaricopaCounty24 to justify its conclusion that the plaintiffs
had standing. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit comprehensively
analyzed the plaintiffs' interests with those of the unknown third parties
whose rights they sought to protect, noting that two criteria must generally be met before standing will be granted. The first requirement is
that the complaining party suffer an injury in fact resulting from the
defendant's actions. 25 The second indispensable element concerns the
zone of interest concept, wherein the plaintiff must assert his own
rights, rather than resting his claim to relief on the legal rights of third
parties.2 6
In reference to the first fundamental requisite, the court deter
mined the "injury in fact" requirement was satisfied by the plaintiff
Builders Association:
Appellees easily satisfy the "injury in fact" standing requirement. The Association alleges it has suffered in its own
right monetary damages due to lost revenues. Sonoma County
builders contribute dues to the Association in a sum proportionate to the amount of business the builders do in the area.
Thus, in a very real sense a restriction on building
in Petaluma
27
causes economic injury to the Association.
A similar conclusion was reached concerning the landowners' alleged
injuries:
The two Landowners also have already suffered or are
threatened with a direct injury. It is their position that the
Petaluma Plan operated, of itself, to adversely affect the value
and marketability of their land for residential uses, and such
an allegation is sufficient to show that28they have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy.
23. The district court dispensed with the standing issue in only one paragraph. The
court, taking a decidedly liberal view of the standing requirements, noted that it was
not necessary, for standing purposes, that the plaintiffs introduce evidence relating to
an individual excluded by the Plan. Id. at 581.
24. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). The specific language quoted by the district court is
found in this opinion. See 375 F. Supp. at 582.
25. 522 F.2d at 903, quoting S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
26. Id., citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), another case involving alleged
exclusionary zoning practices by a municipality.
27. 522 F.2d at 903 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 903-04.
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The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that the "zone of injury"

requirement presented a fatal impediment to the plaintiffs' standing to
present the right to travel issue.29 The court noted that the right to travel,
the primary federal claim upon which the suit was based, was not a
claim asserted on behalf of the plaintiffs, but rather on behalf of a
group of unknown third persons allegedly excluded from living in Petaluma.30 While the plaintiffs arguably suffered economic injury through
application of the Petaluma Plan, these economic interests were outside
the zone of interests protected by any constitutional guarantees of a
right to travel.8 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that none of the
several exceptions to the general rule of standing applied in Petaluma.32 Therefore, since no exceptions existed which would permit

liberalization of the standing requirement for the plaintiffs, they were
precluded from presenting the right to travel claim. The Ninth Circuit

ultimately concluded its discussion of standing by stating that if this
issue was to be litigated, suit would have to be initiated by those
individuals whose mobility was allegedly impaired by the Petaluma

ordinance.

3

29. Id. at 904.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court distinguished the plaintiffs' position from that of the plaintiffs
in the landmark cases of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), noting that in those cases criminal statutes were involved
and that enforcement of such statutes would have infringed directly upon the rights
of third parties not litigants to the suit contesting the statute. While this justified the
expansion of standing in those cases, the court concluded an analogous situation did
not exist in Petaluma. Nor did the court find that type of special, on-going relationship
between the plaintiffs and third persons who might be excluded from living in Petaluma
which would warrant the granting of an exception to the standing requirements generally imposed. The only connection between the plaintiffs and the unknown third persons was the possibility that, but for the existence of the Plan, they would have been
parties to a purchase-sale agreement. However, the plaintiffs did not allege that such
contracts actually existed or that any contractual disruptions had occurred through operation of the zoning plan. In support of this analysis, the court relied inter alia upon
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. 522 F.2d at 904-05. The court noted:
Assuming arguendo that the constitutional right to travel applies to this case,
those individuals whose mobility is impaired may bring suit on their own behalf
and on behalf of those similarly situated. Although Warth v. Seldin denied
standing to a group of low-income and minority group plaintiffs challenging
exclusionary zoning practices, the case is no bar to a suit against the City
brought by a proper group of plaintiffs.
By this language, it appears that the Ninth Circuit has clearly not foreclosed the possibility of a future challenge to the Plan by plaintiffs who may show direct interference
with their constitutional right to travel. However, it is equally apparent that the court
has not conceded that the Plan does unconstitutionally interfere with the right to travel.
Such issues await future resolution.
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Notwithstanding this finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
contest the right to travel issue, the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiffs
did have standing to present their other challenges to the Plan, based
on its alleged arbitrariness, exclusionary nature and burdensome interference with interstate commerce.8 4 On these grounds the court of
appeals dealt directly with the validity of Petaluma's ordinance. The
Ninth Circuit's examination in these areas provides the substantive
importance of the Petalumaholding.
Exclusionaryand Arbitrary

One of the plaintiffs' primary arguments against Petaluma's zoning
plan concerned the alleged exclusionary character of the ordinance.88
In considering the contention that the Plan excluded certain classes of
people from living in Petaluma, the Ninth Circuit reflected upon the
general purpose of zoning regulations, observing that the existence of
an exclusionary element in a zoning ordinance was alone insufficient
to invalidate the regulation.3"
Practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose and effect
the exclusion of some activity or type of structure or a certain density of inhabitants. And in reviewing the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate
with a finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose. We must
determine further whether the exclusion bears any rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. If it does not, then
the zoning regulation is invalid. If, on the other hand, a
legitimate state interest is furthered by the zoning regulation,
we must defer to the legislative act. .

.

. The reasonable-

ness,3 7not the wisdom, of the Petaluma Plan is at issue in this
suit.
The Ninth Circuit thus characterized the crucial determination as
whether the exclusion bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. While the court did not concede that Petaluma's Plan was
exclusionary in fact, it nonetheless examined it to resolve the question
34. Id. at 905.
35. Id. The plaintiffs contended the effect of the Plan was to exclude large numbers of persons from moving to Petaluma. Exclusionary zoning has traditionally been
used to describe municipal zoning regulations whose practical effect, because of minimum lot size and other requirements tending to raise the cost of suburban housing,
is to prevent the migration of low and middle income persons. This, in turn, has the
tendency to limit the movement of racial minorities, since they are frequently within
the lower income categories. See id., n.10.
36. Id. at 906.
37. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/4

8

McCormick: Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma: Ninth Circ

1976]

CONTROLLED GROWTH

of whether the Plan advanced a legitimate state interest. In making
this determination, the Ninth Circuit relied extensively on three important zoning cases: Berman v. Parker,88 Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 9 and Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills.40 The court

observed that Berman clearly provided support for a broad interpretation of the concept of the public welfare to include the power to legislate over matters concerning both the social and physical environment.41 Belle Terre and Los Altos Hills proved useful to the court
in determining whether Petaluma's controlled growth plan could be
included within the broad concept of public welfare outlined in
Berman.
In relying upon the language of the Supreme Court in Belle
Terre,42 and its earlier decision in Los Altos Hills,4 3 the Ninth Circuit
characterized the ordinances upheld in those two cases as even more

restrictive than the Petaluma ordinance:
Both the Belle Terre ordinance and the Los Altos Hills

regulation had the purpose and effect of permanently restrict38. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
39. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
40. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. In Berman, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court, provided an
expansive interpretation of public welfare:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It
is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.
348 U.S. at 33 (citation omitted).
42. In Belle Terre, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a city ordinance restricting land use to single-family dwellings, thereby excluding multi-family residences,
fraternity houses, and boarding houses. In sustaining the ordinance, the Court stated
that such prohibition was within the public welfare because the restricted dwellings presented distinct urban problems, due to the increased noise and traffic resulting from
the more intensive habitation of these dwellings. The Court also noted that
[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This
goal is a permissible one . . . . The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
416 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
43. In focusing upon Los Altos Hills, the Ninth Circuit noted the nature of the
ordinance it upheld in that case. Los Altos Hills passed a zoning ordinance requiring
a minimum one-acre housing lot size, with the additional limitation that only one dwelling unit could be located on the lot. Although, as the court candidly noted, this regulation prevented lower income individuals from living in Los Altos Hills, it nonetheless
was found to be valid because it was rationally related to legitimate governmental interests (restrictions on the population density and preservation of the town's rural environment). 522 F.2d at 907.
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hug growth; nonetheless, the court in each case upheld the
particular law before it on the ground that the regulation
served a legitimate governmental interest falling within the

concept of the public welfare: the preservation of quiet family neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of a
rural environment (Los Altos Hills). Even less restrictive
or exclusionary than the above zoning ordinances is the Peta-

luma Plan which, unlike those ordinances, does not freeze the
population at present or near-present levels. Further, unlike
the Los Altos Hills ordinance and the various zoning regulations struck down by state courts in recent years, the Peta-

luma Plan does not have the undesirable effect of walling out
any particular income class nor any racial minority group.44
By contrasting Petaluma's Plan as less growth restrictive and
exclusionary 5 than the Belle Terre or Los Altos Hills regulations, or
exclusionary zoning ordinances enacted by other cities which were

struck down,48 the court clearly found it easier to uphold the Petaluma

ordinance. Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the zoning plan would exclude some persons from living in
44. Id. at 907-08 (footnotes omitted).
45. The court additionally noted that, to a limited extent, the Plan was "inclusionary," because it offered some previously unavailable housing opportunities to low and
moderate income persons. Before the Plan's implementation, single family, middleincome residences dominated the housing market in Petaluma. See note 8 supra and
accompanying text; 522 F.2d at 900. This effectively precluded low and moderate income groups from purchasing homes within the city. Because the Plan contained a
mandatory number of dwelling units for low and moderate income individuals, the court
took the position this could be characterized as an inclusionary element in the Plan.
Id. at 908, n.16. For a comprehensive discussion of inclusionary ordinances, see Klevin,
Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to
Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv.1432 (1974).
46. 522 F.2d at 908, n.16. A number of municipal ordinances involving minimum
lot sizes or similar restrictions have been invalidated where their practical effect constitutes exclusionary zoning regulations. In contrasting Petaluma's ordinance with these
ordinances, the Ninth Circuit provided an analysis of prior decisions, and the offending
aspects of the zoning regulations in controversy:
[E]ach of the exclusionary zoning regulations invalidated by state courts in
recent years impeded the ability of low and moderate income persons to purchase or rent housing in the locality. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975)
(zoned exclusively for single-family detached dwellings and multi-family
dwellings designed for middle and upper income persons); Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353
(1971) (minimum one or two acre requirement and severe limitation on
multi-family units); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970) (two to three acre minimum lot size); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (prohibition of apartment buildings); National Land
& Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (four acre
minimum lot); Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper,
200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (rezoning to minimum two acre lots
with the effect of keeping poor in another section of municipality).
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Petaluma, it concluded this was not fatal, since the Plan was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable.4 7 Additionally, the court of appeals accepted the plaintiffs' general proposition that unilateral land use
decisions, such as the Petaluma ordinance, would have an effect upon
the needs and resources of the entire region. The court noted, however, that it did not necessarily follow that the plaintiffs' due process
rights were violated in such instance, since the city was exercising
power lawfully delegated to it by the state. If this delegation of zoning
power is ineffectively allocated, and neither serves the state's interest
nor furthers the general welfare of the region, the court suggested it
was the province of the state legislature, rather than the federal courts,
48
to intervene and adjust the system.
Burden on Interstate Commerce
In rejecting the plaintiffs' final argument that the zoning plan
unreasonably burdened interstate commerce, the Ninth Circuit grounded its finding on a series of Supreme Court decisions4 9 holding that
a state regulation, premised on a valid application of the police
power, does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce where the
regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor operates to disrupt its required uniformity. 0 Thus, after concluding that
none of the plaintiffs' objections to the Plan merited affirmation of the
lower court ruling, the Ninth Circuit upheld Petaluma's right to preserve its small town character, open spaces, low density of population,
and desire to grow at a planned, orderly pace. 51
ANALYSIS
Petaluma's controlled growth plan has clearly generated much
controversy, at least in part due to the fact that it has been erroneously
perceived as a no-growth plan.2 However, Petaluma is not unique in
47. Id. at 908.
48. Id.
49. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968); Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
50. 522 F.2d at 909.
51. Id. Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. 424 U.S. 934 (1976). Whether the Court
reaches a different conclusion regarding the validity of Petaluma-type plans when it
decides to take a case involving such plans is open to conjecture; for the present, however, the Court has impliedly given its imprimatur to the Petaluma Plan by denying
certiorari.
52. In many quarters, the Petaluma Plan has been interpreted as a no-growth plan.
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its desire to preserve its character through a system of planned and controlled growth. A number of other local governments around the

country have contemplated, or attempted to implement, similar plans
to protect their social and physical environments from what they perceive to be undesirable trends in community development."5 One of
Articles characterizing the Plan as non-growth oriented include Kellner, Judicial Responses to Comprehensively Planned No-Growth Provisions: Ramapo, Petaluma, and
Beyond, 4 ENVT'L AFr. 759 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kellner]; Siegan, Land Use
Planning in America, Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants, Zoning,
State and Federal Regulation, 5 ENVT'L L. 385 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Siegan];
Note, General Welfare and "No-Growth" Zoning Plans: Consideration of Regional
Needs by Local Authorities, 26 CASE W. REs. L. Ruv. 215 (1975). The label "nogrowth," which has been attached to the Petaluma Plan, appears to be incorrect since
a substantial amount of planned growth is permitted under the Plan. The Plan is not
intended to absolutely halt population growth in Petaluma, but to control and select
desired types of growth. As suggested in note 9 supra, it is apparent that there is
more flexibility in the Plan, relative to the contemplated limit on population growth,
than was originally indicated in the Plan. To state the Plan is no-growth appears somewhat presumptuous and arguably erroneous.
53. A number of communities have been confronted with the same types of growth
pressures as confronted Petaluma. In a number of instances, the reaction of these municipalities' legislative bodies has been similar to that of Petaluma's City Council. For
example, in Boca Raton, Florida voters approved a referendum establishing a limit on
the number of permitted dwelling units, effectively restricting the city's ultimate population growth to around 100,000 inhabitants. Unfortunately, unlike Petaluma and Ramapo, the city did not develop a comprehensive plan to accomplish the goals approved
in the referendum. In little more than a year after approval of the referendum, the
city had experienced a 407o increase in population, reflective of the failure in the
growth control mechanisms the city had implemented. See Smith, Does Petaluma Lie
at the End of the Road from Ramapo, 19 VILL. L REv. 739, 744 (1974); Deutsch,
Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California, 15
SANTA CLARA LAw. 1, 7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch]. Evidence of similar
citizen concern over uncontrolled growth is found in a number of widely diverse cities
which have enacted growth control and population limitation plans. Cities that continue
to question the desirability of unrestrained growth include Boulder, Colorado; Boise,
Idaho; and Scottsdale, Arizona. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAILLiEs & J.BANTA, TuE TAINO
Issup, 38-39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BOSSELMAN, CALLBS & BANTA].
St. George, Vermont has initiated an imaginative plan, whereby the city has purchased all developable land within its borders, and permits its development only when
the city deems it beneficial. Tum NEw Rrunc, September 21, 1974, at 11. Other
areas where there has been movement toward adoption of either comprehensive or limited types of growth control plans include Colorado Springs, Colorado; Denver, Colorado; Dade County, Florida; Hamptons, L.I., New York; Southhampton, Long Island;
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; and Sanbornton, New Hampshire. Landman, supra
note 4, at 205-21. For a comprehensive treatment of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Plan,
see Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land-Use Controls
in the Minneapolis-St.Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MMNN. L. REV. 1009 (1974).
A number of cities in California are engaged in development and implementation
of growth control ordinances. Primarily, these cities have been within the San Francisco Metropolitan Area and members of the Association of Bay Area Governments.
In 1973, the Association adopted a position supporting a long-range regional growth
policy for the Bay Area. Among cities which have taken steps to enact growth control
plans are San lose, Livermore, Pleasanton, and Palo Alto. The type and extent of
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the first and most significant of such plans was that enacted in Ramapo,
New York and unsuccessfully challenged in Golden v. Planning
54
Board.
In Golden, the town of Ramapo passed a zoning ordinance

designed to restrict premature subdivision and urban sprawl by tying
community development to the planned expansion of municipal facilities, under an eighteen-year capital improvements, sequential growth

program.r5

This plan was upheld as a valid exercise of municipal zon-

ing power.

Although Ramapo's plan involved controlled growth poli-

cies resembling those in Petaluma, some substantial distinctions may be
noted between the two plans. One crucial difference concerned the
court's finding that Ramapo, unlike Petaluma, was pressed to its limits

in providing adequate municipal services; its growth policies were,
therefore, necessary and reflective of a valid application of zoning

powers. 0 Additionally, in Golden there was never a stated intention

57
to specifically limit the future population level to an absolute number.

Petaluma has clearly broadened the powers of municipalities in
effecting growth plans beyond that suggested in Golden. Whereas the
Golden court was strongly influenced in upholding the Ramapo plan by
its finding that the plan was necessary, not permanently restrictive, and
not exclusionary, 51 the Ninth Circuit in Petaluma was able to reach an
growth control devices suggested in the zoning enactments of these cities vary from those
of Petaluma and Ramapo, but the essential purpose of limiting the extent of growth
appears to be the same. The fact that other cities in the Bay Area, besides Petaluma,
have felt the need to commence some type of growth control is further evidence of the
intense population pressures experienced in the area. For a comprehensive analysis of
these developments, see generally Clarke & Grable, Growth Control in California:
Prospects for Local Government Implementation of Timing and Sequential Control of
Residential Development, 5 PAc. L.J. 570, 594 (1974); BossELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA,
supra at 44-45; Deutsch, supra at 1-10. Petaluma's success in having its plan upheld
will, no doubt, provide greater impetus for further proliferation of such growth control
plans.

54. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
55. Id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 294-96, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-45.
56. In this regard, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that:
In sum, where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources
of the community are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities
which a substantial increase in population requires, there is a rational basis for
'phased growth' and hence, the challenged ordinance is not violative of the
Federal and State Constitutions.
Id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
57. The Ramapo Plan did not purport to establish an expressed ultimate population
level. The appellate court found that the Plan's purpose was not to "freeze" the population level, but rather to maximize growth by the efficient use of land. Id. at -, 285
N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
58. Id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 302-04, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152-55.
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analogous result without such a finding of dire necessity, and despite
its recognition of the exclusionary effects of the plan.
It is apparent that some fundamental questions are presented with
the implementation of Petaluma-type plans. Specifically, the Petaluma
Plan and the Ninth Circuit decision validating its implementation
suggest important points of inquiry concerning the significance of the
Plan as it relates to the traditional notions of planning and zoning, and
the possible impact of the Petaluma decision on future land use
planning developments. The implications and desirability of such
growth plans present additional issues for resolution.
Petaluma'sImpact and Significance
To determine the impact and significance of the Petaluma Plan,
it is essential to initially establish the degree to which the Plan adheres
to, or deviates from, traditional zoning and land use planning procedures. In a conventional59 residential land use control system, a
general plan is developed which delineates the goals to be accomplished. Zoning regulations are then promulgated and a zoning map
created to outline the types of permitted uses (industrial, commercial
or residential) within the various geographical areas of the city.
Finally, subdivision regulations and building permit requirements are
utilized to retain direct control over residential developments and
assure adherence to the city's plan. In practical effect, the zoning laws,
subdivision regulations and, to a lesser extent, building permit requirements are used to accomplish the goals established in the comprehensive plan. 60
While the Petaluma Plan's express goal of a direct limitation on
population growth indicates a substantial departure from any land use
scheme preceding it, Petaluma is, in many respects, essentially utilizing
the same conventional controls outlined above to accomplish its goal;
it is using them in an unconventional manner, however, by extending
the limits of these controls beyond their normal bounds. While this
59. The term "conventional" is loosely defined to imply land use planning directed
at the traditional goals of segregated-use development, and planning premised upon continued growth, rather than the type of controlled growth ordinances exemplified by
Petaluma-type ordinances.
60. See, e.g., J. BEuSCHER, R. WmoHT & M. GITELmAN, CASES AND MATERLS ON
LAND UsE 353, 538 (2nd ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as BEusCHER, WRIGHT & GITELMAN]; J. BOLLENS & H. ScmANDT, THE METROPoLis: ITS PEOPLF, POLITICS, AND ECONoIAIc LxrE 229-32 (2nd ed. 1970); J. DELAFONS, LA-UsE CoNTROLs IN THR UNT D
STATEs 41-89 (2nd ed. 1969).
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may not be immediately apparent, a close examination of the Plan itself
suggests the validity of this conclusion.
It is clear that, to some degree, the city of Petaluma directly
applied its zoning powers61 to assist in effectuating the Plan. Specifically, it appears that the establishment of the "greenbelt ' ' 62 was at least
partially premised upon the city's zoning power, in that the city prohibited development in and beyond this area. 8 However, it is equally
evident that the more controversial aspects of the Plan-the 500 housing unit limitation and the point system of allocating the developmentunit permits64-demanded the application of control devices beyond

mere zoning restrictions alone.
Just as the problem of rapid, uncontrolled growth in Petaluma did

not result from a failure in the city's zoning controls, the growth problem could not be solved merely through application of zoning regulations, since such regulations are geared toward regulating the types of
permitted uses within various geographical areas of the city, rather than

controlling growth.66

Petaluma was not primarily concerned with

defining and enforcing particular types of land uses; rather it was interested in controlling and directing the expansion of housing develop-

ments in residential zones.66
Arguably, Petaluma could have attempted to control the ultimate
number and density of housing units through more traditional land use
61. "Zoning power" is generally interpreted as the overall source of authority for
a city to establish land use control devices. However, as the Ninth Circuit concluded
in Petaluma, the source of zoning power is premised upon the police powers delegated
to the city by the state. 522 F.2d at 897-98. For the purposes of this article, zoning
power is narrowly defined as the exercise of power to predesignate the purposes for
which land can be used, via zoning regulations, and as only one of a number of parallel
control devices. BEuscHER, WRIGrr & GrIELMAN, supranote 60, at 504.
62. The greenbelt served as the border of development beyond which urban expansion would not be allowed for a period of five to fifteen years. See note 11 supra.
The concept of greenbelts serving as geographical boundaries to urban expansion is not
a new concept; it has existed for at least forty years. BEuscHER, WRIGHT & GrILMAN,
supra note 60, at 254; see D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA. 41-45 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as MANDELER] for an excellent discussion of the effects of greenbelt

boundaries on urban development.
63. Petaluma applied traditional zoning powers in prohibiting the development of
the greenbelt area. There is, however, a further aspect to Petaluma's greenbelt concept;
developers are required to make mandatory dedications, providing land in increments
to the city for the development of the greenbelt. See plaintiffs' complaint, reproduced
in E. RABIN, FuNDAmENTALs OF MODmN REAL PROPERTY LAw 739 (1974). Additionally, the city utilized phased development concepts by refusing to extend city facilities
beyond the greenbelt. See note 12 supra.
64. See note 10 supra.
65. MANDELKE,

supranote 62, at 2-3.

66. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
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control devices, such as by the use of extremely large minimum lot
sizes. However, this approach has several fundamental limitations and
problems implicit in its use. First, it would have defeated the city's
desire for development of multi-family and other types of diversified
housing units, since minimum lot size restrictions are directed at
encouraging single-family dwellings.67 Secondly, many ordinances
requiring large minimum lot sizes have not survived judicial scrutiny
but have been struck down as so blatantly exclusionary in purpose and

effect as to constitute an invalid exercise of the zoning power.0 8 Third,
one purpose of the Plan was to encourage "infilling" in the central part
of the city to achieve a desired density level in that area; neither mini-

mum lot sizes nor other standard zoning restrictions would have accomplished this goal. 9 Finally, minimum lot size restrictions are generally
not useful in controlling the direction of growth; it is doubtful whether
such restrictions alone, or in conjunction with standard zoning regulations, could accomplish this goal without the use of some forceful additional "incentives" to encourage development in certain areas of the
city.70 Thus, it can readily be seen that traditional zoning regulations
67. See note 46 supra; E. SMrIH & D. RIGGs, LAND UsE, OPEN SPACE, AND THE
GOVEINMENT PROCESS 44-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Smrrn & RIGGS].

68. See note 46 supra.
69. Minimum lot size restrictions are generally useful only when applied to undeveloped areas in an effort to preserve open space. SMrrI & RIGGs, supra note 67. The
"infilling" contemplated under the Petaluma Plan involved an effort to encourage development near the center of the city to achieve a higher density level in that area. 522
F.2d at 901. This goal obviously would not be served by minimum lot size restrictions.
Zoning ordinances may control density generally, but, without some additional means
of control, developers would not be encouraged to "fill-in" the central areas of Petaluma.
70. To effectively control the direction of growth, it is essential to have some controls besides basic zoning and minimum lot size restrictions. While the latter two methods can delineate the type of growth permitted in specific areas, they cannot effectively
be used to direct growth. In Petaluma, the city desired both faster growth rates in
some areas, and a slowdown in the growth rate in previously over-developed areas. 522
F.2d at 901.
Prohibiting all growth, through zoning regulations, in the area where development
was not encouraged may have provided a partial solution, since it can logically be supposed that developers, foreclosed from development in this area, would turn to areas
which the city specifically zoned for growth. Since the city did not desire an absolute
termination of all growth in areas where it desired a slower growth rate, however, broad
application of traditional zoning restrictions would have proven insufficient. Specific
incentives were required, which could be used to encourage or discourage development
on a more selective basis. Language within the Petaluma ordinance dealing with the
Residential Development Control System indicates that additional "incentive," required
to direct growth, is accomplished by basing criteria in the Development Allocation Evaluation on how well a proposed subdivision development conforms with the stated goals
of the Plan, including the goal of balanced growth. Landman, supra note 4, at 19398. Thus, to some degree, the award of permits is tied to where development is to
be located, which is certainly a strong incentive to encourage development in specific
areas of the city.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/4

16

McCormick: Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma: Ninth Circ
1976]

CONTROLLED GROWTH

provide an insufficient basis for the degree of growth control contemplated by the Petaluma Plan.

The primary mechanisms utilized by the Petaluma Plan include
subdivision restrictions, the power to issue building permits and the

application of Planned Unit Development (PUD) concepts.7 1

These

three methods provide the essential means for implementing the Plan's
limitations on permitted housing units, density, location of new housing

units, and expansion beyond the urban extension line. In administering the Residential Development Control System, which provided the

procedures and criteria for the award of the 500 annual construction
permits, Petaluma merged subdivision controls and building permit

requirements into a single method of regulating the awarding of permits. In effect, the city has elevated the importance of these methods,

expanding the role such controls ordinarily play in the land use planning process.
Through the procedure of allocating permits on the basis of the

applicant builder's conformity with the city's general plan,72 Petaluma
retains a high degree of control not only over the number of new hous-

ing units constructed, but also over its collateral goals of balanced
growth, adherence to specified architectural designs, low and moderate
income housing unit requirements, dedication of recreational facilities

by the builder in new developments, and mandatory dedication of portions of the "greenbelt" by developers in areas near the urban exten-

sion line. 73 Development unit permits are issued only after the applicant has adhered to all of these development features.
The extent of the Petaluma requirements clearly reflects an ex-

pansion of the usual subdivision "exactions" demanded by municipalities as conditions precedent to a city's approval of a housing development. 74 In the Plan, Petaluma has increased the extent of exactions
71. Planned Unit Development (PUD) is a land use method designed to permit an
integrated mixture of uses-commercial, single-family, and multi-family dwellings-in
the same geographical area. This is in contrast to the traditional concept of segregated
uses contemplated in Euclidian Zoning. SMrrH & RIGGS, supra note 67, at 47. Petaluma
specifically applied the PUD concept in its Plan; one of the specific purposes of the
Plan is to encourage a variety of housing units-multi-family and single-family dwellings-within the geographical area encompassed by the Plan. See note 8 supra.
72. See notes 10 and 70 supra.
73. See notes 12 and 63 supra.
74. As a legitimate exercise of the police power, municipalities, prior to approving
a developer's subdivision, may require "exactions" of land, or fees in lieu thereof, from
the subdivider to meet the need for public improvements generated by the addition of
the subdivision to the city. Such exactions are upheld if they are reasonable. Traditionally, such exactions have included installation of public improvements such as streets,
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to accomplish its goal of balanced and controlled growth." Petaluma
uses the power to issue development permits as the primary method for
encouraging the granting of exactions. Therefore, looking at the
Petaluma Plan in its proper perspective, it is clear that the methods 'of
achieving compliance are largely those that have been traditionally
used; in Petaluma, however, they are utilized in a different manner.
Thus, in this respect, the Plan is not as radical as it has frequently been
perceived to be.
The significance of the Petaluma Plan and the Ninth Circuit's
opinion, however, cannot be understated. The court of appeals, by
approving the controversial growth control provision of the Plan, has
given judicial endorsement to a significant expansion of municipal zoning power. Prior to Petaluma, no court had expressly indicated a city
could directly control its ultimate growth level. Petaluma's apparent
success in this endeavor may well prompt a renewed trend in this direction by other cities. The Plan itself suggests possible future directions
in the utilization of a city's general zoning powers. The problems confronted by Petaluma resisted solution through traditional techniques.
Cities presented with similar land use problems will be tempted to
adopt the more flexible techniques of the Petaluma Plan, including
increased emphasis on subdivision restrictions and the issuance of
building permits, rather than relying upon the more basic zoning
regulations. Such regulations are of limited utility in achieving the
more sophisticated land use purposes outlined in Petaluma, such as
residential infilling, directing the geographical direction of growth, density control, and increased emphasis on aesthetic and environmental
considerations in the style and location of dwelling units. Petaluma
may well promote a heightened awareness of alternative controls to
zoning, focusing future direction of municipal land use planning
development toward greater reliance upon these controls.
sidewalks and sewer systems; dedication of land for parks, playgrounds, police or fire
station sites; and payment of fees, or dedication of land, for schools. See generally
BauscHER, WRirHT & GrrELMAN, supra note 60, at 372; SMITH & RIGGS, supra note
67, at 48; Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 862 (1972).

75. Under the Plan, Petaluma not only requires many of the traditional exactions
outlined in note 74 supra, but also requires developers to donate land for the extension
line greenbelt. Moreover, there is great emphasis in the Plan on requiring somewhat
unusual exactions from the subdivider; these include a specified number of low and moderate income houses in the subdivision to be developed, and adherence to constructing
specified types of environmentally and architecturally-pleasing structures. See notes 810 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/4

18

McCormick: Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma: Ninth Circ

1976]

CONTROLLED GROWTH

Implicationsand Desirabilityof Growth Control
The issues raised in Petaluma reveal current competing and
conflicting policies involved in the growth control controversy. As the
contrasting opinions of the district court and court of appeals in Petaluma indicate, there are forceful arguments supporting the positions of
both proponents and opponents of growth restraint plans.
The opponents of Petaluma-type plans voice numerous criticisms
of such ordinances. At the heart of most criticism is the contention
that such plans have the effect of: (1) discouraging the construction
of needed housing units, (2) increasing the development of rural, undeveloped land and encouraging greater suburbanization, because the
general emphasis on less density per acre of land available in one city
encourages the development of the open land areas surrounding other
suburban communities, and (3) establishing a de facto method of locking poor people into large urban areas, due to their inability to compete
with more affluent home-buyers in purchasing the smaller number of
available residential units. 7 6 In substance, opponents question the
desirability of implementing a system of controlled growth if the effect
is to prevent some people from enjoying the opportunity to improve
their personal housing situations.
Equally compelling is the position of advocates of growth control
plans who desire to preserve the character and aesthetic beauty of their
communities from the negative effects of uncontrolled expansion.
With the continuing migration to the suburbs and beyond, it is evident
that pressures for expansion will increase, while the movement
toward greater restraints by areas absorbing this migration will likely
gain greater acceptance. It seems inevitable that this trend will
intensify growth conflicts.
In view of these conflicts, it is fortunate that the Ninth Circuit has
directly confronted the growth control issue in Petaluma, instead of
judicially sidestepping it. In balancing the interests involved, the court
rendered a decision with a profound impact upon traditional concepts
of zoning law and land use planning. Although other circuits will
undoubtedly be presented with future cases questioning the merits of
growth plans, it is apparent that the piecemeal development of judicial
standards to test the legitimacy of such plans is inadequate, since courts
are unequipped to effectively deal with the complex problems of
76. See Siegan, supra note 52, at 423-28; See generally Kellner, supra note 52.
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growth control. Moreover, it is futile for cities to attempt to solve
growth problems by pushing them off onto neighboring communities.
Despite the localism implicit in the Petaluma Plan, the problems
presented suggest the need for a regional approach to the dilemma of
uncontrolled growth. Long-range solutions to the problems inherent
in the growth-control controversy must come through development of
planning agencies that are authorized to engage in a regional determination of desirable growth patterns. Such planning should consider
the overall need for a planned growth control policy to better conserve
and protect each community from undesirable population increases,
while introducing a balanced growth plan for the entire region.77
Regional planning obviously needs support from the individual
municipalities involved, and must be carefully developed to avoid
imposition of unreasonable growth rates on any single municipality in
the area. To accomplish such goals a regional planning body has to,
utilize a variety of complex planning tools, requiring substantial agency
power to facilitate the implementation of regional growth plans. This
necessitates the surrender of substantial local autonomy in the planning
area; a thought certain to provoke additional controversy, but ultimately
the only effective solution to the conflicting problems outlined in
Petaluma.
The possibility suggested by the district court in Petaluma of
reactionary development of Petaluma-type ordinances by several municipalities in one region, creating a regional housing "crisis,"" 8 is not
as remote a possibility as it at first may appear to be. If Petaluma
has the impact on planning it potentially could have, it is not inconceivable that numerous other municipalities in a metropolitan area may
desire to implement similar growth restraint plans to the ultimate detriment of the entire region.
CONCLUSION

Although Petaluma has clearly given individual municipalities
77. The concept of a regional "fair share" plan, involving a "sharing" of both total
numerical growth, as well as growth in terms of low and moderate income population,
may be a productive consideration in establishing a balanced regional growth plan. In
Kushner, Land Use Litigation and Low Income Housing: Mandating Regional Fair
Share Plans, 9 CLEA NGHOUSE RaV. 10 (1975), the author discusses a fair share plan
in terms of mandating that a community make available housing for low and moderate
income persons, based upon its "fair share" of the regional needs. This idea appears
to be adaptable, in terms of sharing all types of growth, among cities in a specific geographical area.
78. See note 20 supra.
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control over their own growth, no judicial solution seems adequate to
alleviate the problems implicit in extensive community development
of such plans. The most positive impact that can be hoped for from
Petaluma is that the decision will prompt the type of thorough legislative examination needed to meet, and hopefully resolve, what are certain to be even more complex and difficult growth control problems
developing in the future.

Timothy E. McCormick
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